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NOTE
CAUSATION OR CORRELATION? THE IMPACT
OF LULAC V. CLEMENTS ON SECTION

2

LAWSUITS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Elizabeth M. Ryan*
Under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, illegal vote dilution exists
when an electoral standard,practice, or procedure results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color
Plaintiffs demonstrate vote dilution by introducing evidence regarding a variety of objective factors, including whether voting in the
jurisdictionin question is polarized along racial lines. In 1993, the
Fifth Circuit adopted a new standardfor section 2 plaintiffs trying
to prove raciallypolarized voting. The Fifth Circuitheld that demonstrating a mere correlationbetween race and vote was insufficient to
establish racially polarized voting when some factor other than race
might explain an apparentdivergence in voter preferences. Instead,
plaintiffs must show that race-basedconsiderationscaused the polarized voting pattern. Many commentators lamented the decision and
predicted that the new standardrepresented the death knell for section 2 lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit. This Note examines the history of
section 2 as amended and concludes that the Fifth Circuit's standard is inconsistent with congressional intent and misconstrues
Supreme Court precedent. This Note reviews Fifth Circuit case law
applying the new standardandfinds that it may be outcome determinative when applied, but that few cases actually turn on the
application of the standard,which suggests that its impact has been
less pervasive than commentatorsfeared.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion that reinvented plaintiffs'
burden under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA").' League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements ("LULAC') 2 answered a

question left unresolved by the Supreme Court 3-whether a vote dilution
claimant must show racial bias among voters to be successful-in the affirmative. Vote dilution "is a process whereby election laws or practices,
either singly or in concert, combine with systematic bloc voting among an
identifiable group to diminish the voting strength of at least one other
group. 4 The LULAC court demanded an express inquiry into the causal relationship between the challenged electoral scheme and the alleged vote
dilution.5 Statistical evidence indicating a correlation between race and voting preferences no longer sufficed to prove racial bloc voting if some factor
other than race, such as party affiliation, could also explain the divergence.6
Courts in other circuits soon followed the Fifth Circuit's lead.7
Aggressively applied, the LULAC standard had the potential to radically
alter section 2 litigation because it inserted an individual-intent element into
an analysis that previously focused on effect. The Fifth Circuit required direct evidence revealing a race-based explanation for voters' choices at the

1.

Section 2 provides, in part:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color ...
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
2.

999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

3.
(1986)).

See infra text accompanying notes 54-62 (discussing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30

4.

Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial and

Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS

ACT, 1965-1990, at 21, 22 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); see also Gingles,
478 U.S. at 46 n.l I ("Dilution of racial minority group voting strength may be caused by the dispersal of blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or from the
concentration of blacks into districts where they constitute an excessive majority.").
5.

See infra Section H.C.

6.

See infra Section H.C.

7. See Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1394
(11 th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Mallory v. Ohio, 38 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Reed v. Town of
Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). But see Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1322 (10th
Cir. 1996).
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polls, rather than general evidence of starkly divergent candidate prefer8
ences among white and non-white voters. In short, the LULAC court
rejected the notion that a mere correlation between race and vote could
demonstrate legally significant racial bloc voting. Instead, the court demanded evidence of the causes behind those voting patterns.
Many commentators responded to the decision with urgent criticism, arguing that the opinion gutted the VRA and imposed an "unbearable burden
on plaintiffs to defeat every possibility other than race for denial of their
right to vote." 9 The LULAC court's dissenters were more precise, noting that
the majority's holding "eviscerated section 2 of the VRA in communities
where there is any measurable crossover voting by whites."' These critics
argued that the Fifth Circuit's definition of racial bloc voting was incompatible with Supreme Court precedent and congressional intent."
When applied, the LULAC standard may be outcome determinative.
Fifth Circuit case law reveals that most plaintiffs fail to present sufficient
evidence of racially motivated voting patterns to prove racial bloc voting
under the LULAC standard, a crucial element of the section 2 vote dilution
analysis.' 2 As other circuits followed the Fifth Circuit's lead, a similar trend
emerged around the country: when courts adopt a LULAC-like causation
requirement-inquiring into the causes of polarized voting pattesplaintiffs struggle to make out section 2 claims.' 3 Evaluating case law from
the Fifth Circuit is instructive because LULAC announced a particularly
stringent causation rule with sweeping implications for plaintiffs, although
the circuit subsequently refined the standard to impose a narrower, yet still
significant, burden.' 4 But the relationship between plaintiff losses and the
LULAC causation principle is not entirely clear: Are they merely correlated,
or does an obligation to prove that racial considerations caused polarized
voting fatally impair a vote dilution lawsuit? In the fourteen years following

8. See infra Section H.C. Typically, non-white voters are the minority population that invokes section 2 to remedy vote dilution. This Note uses this white/non-white terminology for the
sake of simplicity, but section 2 also protects white voters when they are the minority population
suffering vote dilution. E.g., United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440 (S.D. Miss. 2007).
9. Marcia Johnson, The Systematic Denialof the Right to Vote to America's Minorities, II
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 61, 75 (1994); see also Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin, The Voting
Rights Act and the "New and Improved" Intent Test: Old Wine in New Bottles, 16 TOURo L. REV.
943, 963 (2000); James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent
Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 590-92 (1999).
10. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 910 (5th Cir.
1993) (King, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., id. at 901; Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65
Miss. L.J. 205, 210, 222 (1995).
12.

See infra Part 1l.

13. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982. 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 672 nn.144-45 (2006)
(listing cases in which the court found plaintiffs had failed to meet their causation burden); Tucker,
supra note 9, at 586 n.719.
14.

See infra Section lI.A.
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the LULAC court's opinion,"' plaintiffs in the Fifth Circuit won about half as
many section 2 lawsuits as they had between 1982 and 1993, but a variety of
factors could reasonably explain this trend. 6 In fact, most plaintiff losses in
the years following LULAC did not clearly turn on the question of causation.
In many cases, the causation issue was absent entirely from the court's
analysis. 7
Nevertheless, a review of published section 2 opinions from the Fifth
Circuit reveals a striking pattern and suggests that a stringent application of
the LULAC standard threatens the framework Congress constructed for section 2 lawsuits."' In cases where the court expressly addressed causation,
plaintiffs won only if the record before the court was silent on causation.' 9 In
this way, even if it has not changed the calculus of every vote dilution case
in the circuit, the LULAC causation standard inflicts a greater burden on
plaintiffs than Congress imposed and than the Supreme Court endorsed.
Part I of this Note introduces the VRA and tracks the history and development of racially polarized voting as an element of a section 2 vote
dilution claim. Part II argues that the standard enunciated in LULAC is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the 1982 Amendments to the VRA.
It undermines a congressional compromise that struck a balance between
competing interests: a vote dilution standard that neither required plaintiffs
to produce evidence of discriminatory intent nor amounted to guaranteed
proportional representation. Part II also explores Supreme Court case law
interpreting the 1982 Amendments and concludes that the LULAC majority
misconstrued Supreme Court precedent. Part III reviews the decisions published by the courts in the Fifth Circuit in the years since LULAC,
demonstrating that the LULAC standard, when invoked, frustrates minority
plaintiffs' success under section 2 by demanding evidence that Congress and
the Supreme Court did not require. The total number of cases that turned on
the application of this standard, however, is quite small, which suggests that
the issue of causation has had a less pervasive effect than some commentators initially anticipated.

15.

This Note considers cases decided through 2007.

16.

See infra Part In.

17.

See infra Part III.

18.

See infra Section lI.A (discussing the 1982 Amendments to the VRA).

19. See infra Section HI.B. One of the Fifth Circuit's refinements to the LULAC standard
established that the defendant bore the initial burden of raising the causation issue by offering a
non-race-based explanation for racially divergent voting patterns. If the defendant failed to introduce
such evidence, the plaintiff could establish racially polarized voting simply by demonstrating a
correlation between race and vote. See Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1996);
see also infra Section III.A.
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I.

BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the VRA 20 "to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting. ' 2' Authority for its passage rests in Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment.22 Laws explicitly prohibiting black citizens from voting had
been unconstitutional since the states ratified the Fifteenth Amendment in
1870, but state and local governments employed alternate techniques to im21
pede access to the polls, usually by restricting black voter registration.
Congress passed the VRA after the Department of Justice concluded that

individual enforcement actions to enjoin these discriminatory practices were
inadequate.

24

A. Early Implementation of the VRA
The VRA's initial purpose was to eliminate persistent barriers to the minority franchise, but Congress and the Supreme Court understood that "[t]he
right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an
absolute prohibition on casting a ballot." 25 In response to successful minority
registration efforts, local political jurisdictions adopted an array of dilution
26
schemes to minimize the impact of minority votes. These schemes included reclassifying elected posts as appointed posts, gerrymandering
election boundaries, replacing single-member-district systems with at-large
elections, and imposing majority runoff requirements where the previously
existing plurality system had enabled minority victories.27 By the 1970s,
28
plaintiffs were using the VRA to successfully challenge these practices.
During the 1970s, courts presented with vote dilution cases typically considered a series of evidentiary factors to determine whether electoral schemes
had "invidious effects., 29 Two key cases3° established this multifactor framework by articulating what came to be known as the "White-Zimmer

20.

42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000).

21.
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966) (providing a brief history of the
law and confirming the constitutionality of challenged provisions).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (providing Congress the power to enforce the Amendment
"by appropriate legislation"); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
23.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 6 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969)).

26.

Id.

27.

Id.

28.

See Davidson, supra note 4, at 22.

29. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 177 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part); see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-70 (1973) (surveying the
district court's review of the evidence and affirming its conclusion that the political process in two
Texas counties was not equally open to blacks and Mexican-Americans).
30. See White, 412 U.S. 755; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en
banc), aff'd sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
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standard."'" Through this inquiry, courts sought to determine whether the

"totality of circumstances"32 indicated that "the political processes leading to
nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group
in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents
in the district to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of
34
their choice."33 This standard did not require proof of discriminatory intent.
In 1980, the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden35 provided the impetus for a new phase in this nation's voting rights history,
spurring Congress to amend section 2 of the VRA. In Bolden, the Court

concluded that, without evidence of purposeful, official discrimination, the
multifactor evidentiary test embraced by federal courts during the 1970s was

insufficient to sustain a voting rights claim under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment.36 The Court required plaintiffs to prove intentional,
official discrimination.37 The Bolden standard, requiring proof of purposeful

discrimination, imposed a greater burden on plaintiffs than the WhiteZimmer standard had.38
B. Reaffirming the "Effects Test"

Congress responded quickly, amending the VRA in 1982 to explicitly
authorize a results-based inquiry, akin to the White-Zimmer test of the pre-

vious decade.39 The amended law has been a powerful tool for minority
voters seeking to remedy racially discriminatory voting practices.40 While
the original statutory text mirrored the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, 41 section 2 of the VRA now takes a two-part approach. Paragraph (a)
states the rule, and paragraph (b) defines its scope:
31.

Frank R. Parker et al., Mississippi, in

QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT

OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, supra note

32.

42 U.S.C § 1973(b) (2000).

33.

White, 412 U.S. at 766.

4, at 136, 141.

34. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 n.8 (1986); S.REP. No. 97-417, at 16 (1982), as
reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 193; see also Parker etal., supra note 31, at 141.
35.

446 U.S. 55 (1980).

36.

Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65, 67-68.

37.

Id. at 67-68; S.REP. No. 97-417, at 24.

38. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16; Davidson, supra note 4, at 34 ("The intent requirement seemed to be the straw that would break the camel's back in voting rights cases, where the
load borne by the plaintiffs' camel was already heavy.").
39. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131; S.REP. No.
97-417, at 2; id. at 28 ("[P]laintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving
any kind of discriminatory purpose.").
40.

See Katz et al., supra note 13, at 649-50.

41.
As enacted in 1965, section 2 stated: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a) (2000)); see also Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61 ("[T]he ... legislative history of § 2 makes
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(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) ... is established if, based on the totality
of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
that may be considered: Provided,That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.
The crucial change in language is the focus on results, which clarifies that
the language "on account of race or color" does not "connote any required
purpose of racial discrimination" but rather means "with respect to race or

color.'

43

Congress intended this language to return voting rights jurispru-

dence to its pre-Bolden form. 44 The Senate Committee Report accompanying

the legislation was explicit:
In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a prerequisite to establishing a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Therefore, the Committee has amended Section 2 to permit plaintiffs to
prove violations by showing that minority voters were denied an equal
45
chance to participate in the political process ....
The Report restated the results-oriented White-Zimmer test as the appro-

priate standard for judging vote dilution claims under section 2, identifying
nine factors for courts to consider.4' Evaluating these factors enables courts
clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.").
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
43. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 n.109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,35, 44 n.8 (1986); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 2.
45. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16. The Senate Report focused on explaining why it rejected the
Supreme Court's intentional official discrimination test, but its language embraced a broader vision
for the results test. For example, the Senate Report declared that "the specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of
discriminatory purpose." Id. at 28 (emphasis added); see infra Section II.A (discussing Congress's
rejection of the Bolden intent test).
46. The nine factors are:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that

touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially po-

larized;
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to asses the "total circumstances of the local electoral process," which in
turn permits them to determine whether minority voters enjoy an equal opportunity to participate in the political process . One of the nine factors
considers the extent to which voting in the community is racially polarized,48
and with Congress's rejection of the Bolden official-intent test the debate
turned to whether, for purposes of section 2, racially polarized voting incorporated an individual discriminatory-intent element.

In 1986, the Supreme Court considered the amended section 2 for the
first time. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court divided on some key points,
but a majority embraced the White-Zimmer totality of circumstances test and
created an additional threshold test for lawsuits arising under section 2. 4 ' To

pass the threshold, plaintiffs must show the following: (1) the minority
group bringing the challenge "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district"; (2) the minority
group "is politically cohesive"; and (3) "the white majority votes sufficiently
as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."5 ° If the plaintiffs meet the three preconditions, the court then proceeds
to a totality of circumstances analysis, guided by the White-Zimmer factors.
Both the second and third prongs of the Gingles test explore whether
voting is racially polarized: the second prong considers whether the minority

group votes cohesively in favor of certain candidates; the third considers
whether majority voters vote cohesively in opposition to those candidates."

Racially polarized voting "exists where there is a consistent relationship

3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or
procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been
denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear
the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder
their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the
jurisdiction[;]

[8.] whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the
particularized needs of the members of the minority group[; and]
[9.] whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
47.

Id. at 16; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35-36.

48.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29.

49.

See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-5 1.

50.

Id. at 50-51.

51.

Katz et al., supra note 13, at 664.
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between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes.""2 Although the Gingles preconditions were originally conceived to apply to
challenges to multi-member districting schemes, the Supreme Court has
since applied them to cases challenging single-member districts as well.53
C. DecipheringGingles-CausationVersus Correlation
In Gingles, despite adopting the threshold test discussed above, the

Supreme Court failed to obtain a clear majority in support of a mechanism
or standard for identifying legally significant racially polarized voting, a
critical component of the threshold test and of the White-Zimmer multifactor
analysis.54 A majority agreed that "in general, a white bloc vote that
normally will defeat the combined strength of minority support plus white
'crossover' votes rises to the level of legally significant white bloc voting."55
But the Justices were conflicted about whether the forces driving polarized
voting patterns were relevant to this finding. The defendants argued that
statistical analysis revealing a correlation between race and vote was
insufficient to demonstrate racially polarized voting because it failed to
evaluate the impact of other variables-for example, class, party, education,
and age-on voter preference.56 Justice Brennan, joined by three other
Justices, concluded that a correlation between race and voting preference
satisfied the section 2 racially polarized voting standard; the causes behind

52.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

53. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 157-58 (1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25,
39-40 (1993). In a multi-member districting system, more than one candidate for a seat on a governmental body, such as city council, is elected from a single district. A multi-member districting
system is similar to an at-large system, in which "all the contested seats on a governmental body...
are filled by voters in the jurisdiction at large." Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Editors'
Introduction, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965-1990, supra note 4, at 3, 7. Under a single-member districting scheme, the jurisdiction "is
divided into geographical districts, and voters in each district ... are limited to a vote for a single
candidate running to represent their district." Id.
54. Compare Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[Tihe legal concept
of racially polarized voting, as it relates to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a
correlation between the race of voters and the selection of certain candidates. Plaintiffs need not
prove causation or intent in order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting and defendants
may not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent."), with id. at 83 (White, J., concurring)
(rejecting Brennan's determination that "the race of the candidate is irrelevant" to the polarized
voting inquiry but not elaborating on a more appropriate standard), and id. at 100 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group in a particular election was
rejected by white voters for reasons other than those which made that candidate the preferred choice
of the minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by
white voters will consistently defeat minority candidates.").
55.

Id. at 56 (majority opinion).

56.

Id. at 61-62 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 957

n.58.
57. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined this portion of Justice Brennan's opinion. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
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58

the correlation were irrelevant. Justice O'Connor, with an additional three
Justices," rejected Justice Brennan's rigid three-part threshold test 60 and his

view that cause was always irrelevant under section 2. In her view, evidence
explaining why white votes diverged from minority votes could be relevant

in some circumstances." Justice White, who joined Justice Brennan's
opinion for the Court but not his discussion of what evidence supported a
finding of racially polarized voting, filed a one-paragraph concurring
opinion explaining that he disagreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion that
the race of the candidate was always irrelevant under section 2. 62 Although
many voting rights attorneys welcomed the Gingles threshold test because it

"streamlined the evidentiary requirements for minority plaintiffs,
the
lower courts responded to the Supreme Court's internal indecision by
adopting varied interpretations of the Gingles test and imposing varied

standards. 64 Some courts sought evidence revealing the causes behind
6
racially polarized voting, whereas others shied away from this element.
The Fifth Circuit's case law is illustrative because it presents a transformation over time culminating in one of the federal judiciary's strongest
statements on the role of causation in the racial bloc-voting inquiry.66 A
58. Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("For purposes of § 2, the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent."); id. at 63 ("[U]nder the 'results
test' of § 2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the
causes of the correlation, matters.").
59. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
60.

See supra text accompanying note 50 (describing Justice Brennan's three-part test).

61.
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Evidence that a candidate preferred by the minority group ... was rejected by white voters for reasons other than those which
made that candidate the preferred choice of the minority group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority
candidates.").
62.

Id. at 82-83 (White, J., concurring).

63. Davidson, supra note 4, at 35; see also Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have
Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's the Only
Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1237, 1240 (1993).
64. See Katz et al., supra note 13, at 660-75 (surveying courts' applications of the three
Gingles factors). Some courts responded to the Court's opinion with humor. See, e.g., League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F Supp. 596, 597 (W.D. Tex. 1986)
("[T]he court has been requested to 'Gingleize' (pronounced gin-gull-eyes) it previous decision. At
the outset, the Court recalls a song fairly popular in the late 30's or early 40's that went in part as
follows: I've got spurs that jingle, jangle, 'Gingle'/As I go riding merrily along/And they say 'Oh
ain't you glad you're single' 1And that song's not so very far from wrong." (paragraphing altered)),
aff'd 812F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987).
65. See Katz et al., supra note 13, at 670-71; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 960-77
(exploring different judicial responses to the conflicting opinions presented in Gingles); Sushma
Soni, Note, Defining the Minority-PreferredCandidate Under Section 2, 99 YALE L.J. 1651, 165760 (1990) (exploring various approaches to identifying the minority-preferred candidate, a critical
element of the racial bloc-voting inquiry).
66. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F2d 831 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc); David D. O'Donnell, Wading into the "Serbonian Bog" of Vote Dilution Claims
UnderAmended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Making the Way Towards a PrincipledApproach
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survey of section 2 lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit reveals that courts in the
circuit were initially uncertain of the precise parameters of the Gingles ra-

cial bloc-voting test.67 In some cases, courts relied on evidence indicating a
correlation between the voter's race and choice of candidate, and remained
61
silent on the question of causation. In these instances, the court typically
accepted statistical evidence demonstrating divergent voting patterns by
race-for example, evidence that minority candidates received consistent

electoral support in primarily minority precincts and minimal support in
61

primarily white precincts. In at least one case, a panel of the Fifth Circuit
admitted its uncertainty about the appropriate standard. 70 By the early 1990s,
the Fifth Circuit began to settle on a version of the approach Justice
O'Connor described in Gingles. The court required "an inquiry into the
causal relationship between the challenged practice and the lack of electoral
success by the protected class voters.'

This causation versus correlation debate came to a head with the Fifth
Circuit's en banc decision in LULAC, where the court held that when "parti-

san affiliation, not race, best explains the divergent voting patterns among
minority and white citizens," plaintiffs' section 2 claims must fail. The
court found that where partisan politics could explain minority losses, section 2 had no place because the VRA protects racial minorities, not political

parties.7 ' The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the district court's conclusion
that "plaintiffs need only demonstrate that whites and blacks generally support different candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting"
74
under the third prong of Gingles. Rather, the district court was wrong to
to "Racially Polarized Voting", 65 Miss L.J. 345, 382 (1995) (distinguishing the racial animus
model presented in LULAC from approaches adopted by other circuits).
67. While causation is relevant to both the second and third Gingles preconditions, the debate played out most clearly where courts applied Gingles's white bloc-voting prong.
68. See, e.g., Campos v. City of Baytown, 696 F Supp. 1128, 1134 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding
the third prong of Gingles satisfied based on: (1) evidence that "in all city council races in which a
minority candidate ha[d] run, the minority candidate ha[d] lost"; (2) evidence of a "correlation between votes for minority candidates and proportion of minority population"; and (3) data analysis
indicating the degree of "white support for minority candidates ranging from 2% to 41%"), aff'd
840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988); Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. at 601-03, 607 (relying on a
correlative showing of voting preferences by race to conclude that voting in the district was racially
polarized).
69.

See, e.g., MidlandIndep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. at 601-02.

70. Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting the uncertainty
surrounding "what constitutes evidence of legally significant, racially polarized voting" and affirming the district court's methodology while acknowledging that "it is not the only permissible way to
approach § 2 claims").
71. Salas v. Sw. Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 F.2d 1542, 1554 (5th Cir. 1992). The court noted
that the third Gingles precondition "aims at determining whether it is racial voting patterns, along
with other objective factors, rather than some other set of causes, that explain the lack of electoral
success of voters within the protected class." Id.
72. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc).
73.

See infra Section II.C.

74.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 850.
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exclude evidence attributing polarized voting patterns to nonracial causes,
such as party affiliation." At the very least, plaintiffs must be prepared to
"negate partisan politics as an explanatory factor for the consistent defeat of
their preferred candidates.

76

The Fifth Circuit did not explain exactly what a plaintiff had to prove in
order to satisfy the Gingles racial bloc-voting standard," but after LULAC it

appeared• that
statistical evidence of racially divergent voting was no longer
18
sufficient. The decision may have raised more questions than it answered.
The court did not decide whether plaintiffs must affirmatively disprove all
possible nonracial causes behind divergent voting patterns. 79 Nor did it ex-

plain precisely where the evidentiary burdens lay or how plaintiffs might
rebut suggestions that partisanship drove voting preferences. 0 The opinion
even left open the possibility that minority plaintiffs may have to prove ra-

cial animus in the electorate in order to demonstrate legally significant white
bloc voting.8

II. LULAC:

THE NEW INTENT REQUIREMENT

Under the LULAC majority's conceptualization of the Gingles threshold

test, minority plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that partisan affiliation
is not the cause underlying racial polarization in voting and resulting minor82
ity electoral losses. The flaw in the court's construction is not that it
requires courts to consider the causes underlying minority-preferred candidates' persistent electoral losses. Rather, it incorrectly isolates this causation
element from the complete section 2 vote dilution analysis.8 3 Given persis-

tent correlations between race and vote, 84 isolating the causation inquiry
from a broader analysis of the "local political landscape"85 and requiring
75.

Id.

76. Id. at 902 (King, J., dissenting); see also Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1223 (1996).
77.

See O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 369.

78.

See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 850.

79. Id. at 860 ("[W]e need not resolve the debate today. Whether or not the burden of the
plaintiffs to prove bloc voting includes the burden to explain partisan influence, the result is the
same. This is so even if the partisan voting is viewed as a defensive parry."); see also Teague v.
Attala County, No. CIV.A.I:91CV209-D-D, 1995 WL 1945393, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 1995)
(concluding that plaintiffs failed to show racially polarized voting because the record was void of
any discussion of the potential impacts of factors other than race), rev'd, Teague v. Attala County, 92
F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996).
80.

LULAC, 999 F2d at 859-60, 860 n.27; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 963.

81.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 860; O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 369.

82.

See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 861; O'Donnell, supra note 66, at 374.

83. Cf City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for viewing each of the White-Zimmer factors in isolation, rather than as interrelated
elements comprising a whole picture).
84.

See infra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.

85.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 912 (King, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs to establish that partisanship is not the "true" cause of polarized
voting enhances the Gingles threshold burden. In this way, LULAC disrupts
the balance that Congress constructed to preserve section 2 as an effective
••6
tool against vote dilution. This Part argues that the LULAC court's holding
contravenes the 1982 Amendments to the VRA by effectively imposing a
stand-alone intent test in the racial bloc-voting prong of the vote dilution
analysis. Section I.A analyzes the 1982 Amendments and explains the vote
dilution standard Congress endorsed: a totality of circumstances analysis
through which courts collect evidence to support an implicit inference about
causation without requiring an express or independent causation analysis.
Section II.B argues that in Gingles, the Supreme Court respected congressional intent and sustained this standard. Finally, Section II.C demonstrates
the extent to which the LULAC majority departed from this precedent.
A. CongressionalIntent and the 1982 Amendments
Although Congress's attention in 1982 was focused on reversing the official discrimination standard that the Supreme Court had adopted in
Bolden, the plain language of the statute and the committee report accompanying the amendments demonstrate that an individual-intent standard of the
sort adopted by the LULAC majority is also inconsistent with congressional
intent. Amending section 2, Congress was guided by an awareness of the
subtlety and complexity of the issues raised in vote dilution cases and by the
underlying purpose of the VRA. 8 Congress expressly targeted electoral systems that "result[ed] in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color.'88 The committee report accompanying the amendments stressed that the results test codified in
the amendments was consistent with the original legislative intent behind
the VRA and with judicial precedent prior to Bolden."9 It also explained the
rationale behind Congress's decision to reject the Bolden standard in favor
of the results test, which did not require evidence of discriminatory purpose,
but also did not guarantee proportional representation based on race. 90 As
Justice Brennan recognized in Gingles, many of the reasons that Congress
identified for rejecting the Bolden official-intent test apply equally to a racially polarized voting standard that requires plaintiffs to prove individual
voter intent. 9'
86. Id. at 901 ("[Tlhe majority has distorted Congressional intent, rejected Supreme Court
precedent, and completely altered the focus of the section 2 inquiry.").
87.
214-15.

See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36-37 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,

88.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).

89.

See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16; see also supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.

90. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16 (summarizing key congressional findings underlying the committee's rejection of the intent test).
91. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 70-73 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("Appellants' suggestion that the discriminatory intent of individual white voters must be proved in order
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Congress deemed an intent test "inappropriate as the exclusive standard
for establishing a violation of Section 2 ' , 92 because that test did not adequately account for the complex realities facing minority plaintiffs. 93 First,
Congress believed that the Bolden intent test was "an inordinately difficult
burden for plaintiffs in most cases, ' 94 in part because it required them to

seek records proving that state or local officials acted with discriminatory
purpose. In lawsuits challenging laws enacted many decades prior, those
records may no longer exist; in lawsuits challenging recent or future laws,
they may never exist. 95 Particularly in the context of recent or future enactments, the intent requirement was more likely to result in an easy out for
defendants who could "offer a non-racial rationalization for a law which in
fact purposely discriminate[d]. 96 Similarly, in order to show that racial considerations caused individual voter selections at the ballot box, "it would be
necessary to demonstrate that other potentially relevant causalfactors, such
as socioeconomic characteristics and candidate expenditures, do not correlate better than racial animosity with white voting behavior." 97 While certain
sophisticated statistical analyses attempt to isolate race from other potentially relevant factors, the complex relationships among the various factors
make these efforts theoretically complicated and, often, indeterminate in
practice. 9
Second, the Bolden intent test diverted "the judicial [inquiry] from the
crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral
process to a historical question of individual motives." 99 Congress sought to
avoid the divisiveness that would result from requiring plaintiffs to lodge
"charges of racism on the part of individual officials or entire communities."' ° Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that "[s]uch inquiries can only be
divisive, threatening to destroy any existing racial progress in a community."'O° The official discrimination test required plaintiffs to demonstrate
that a few elected officials intentionally discriminated against minorities.
Under an individual voter-intent test, plaintiffs would have to prove that
to make out a § 2 claim must fail for the very reasons Congress rejected the intent test with respect
to govemmental bodies.").
92.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36.

93.

See id. at 36-37.

94.

Id. at 36.

95.

Id. at 36-37.

96.

Id. at 37.

97.

Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 72 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

98. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831,
907-08 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting). Judge King's dissent catalogued several of
the weaknesses inherent in the use of multivariate regression analysis to determine the causes behind
racially divergent voting patterns. See also Karlan & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1223-24.
99.

S. REP. No. 97417, at 16.

100.

Id. at 36.

101.

Id.
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scores of individuals expressed racial bias through their votes. "It is difficult
to imagine a more racially divisive requirement."'' 2
Finally,
either intent test impeded the goals the VRA was designed to
• 103

achieve. Because Congress sought to eradicate electoral schemes that resulted in unequal participation in the political process, it concluded that the
Bolden intent test "ask[ed] the wrong question."' ° Congress was determined

to provide a tool for ensuring minority voters a "fair opportunity to participate" in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice.' 5 This
opportunity was absent when "discriminatory election systems or practices
•.. operate[d], designedly or otherwise, to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength and political effectiveness of minority groups."' Congress intended
to eradicate electoral schemes that, in operation, impermissibly burdened
minority groups, regardless of the purposes behind those schemes.' 7 "Focusing on the discriminatory intent of the voters, rather than the behavior of
the voters," similarly distracts from the functional, results-oriented evaluation that Congress adopted.' °8
It is critical to recognize that, while Congress explicitly rejected the
Bolden intentional discrimination test in favor of a results-based standard,

the amended standard is not free from an inquiry into the causes behind a
minority group's apparent inability to participate equally in the political
process. The totality of circumstances language included in section 2(b) '°9
yields a vote dilution standard that implicitly considers the causes behind
minority electoral losses as part of the overall analysis, without requiring
plaintiffs to offer direct evidence of purposeful discrimination." 0 Plaintiffs
must demonstrate that minority electoral failures occur "on account of race or
color."" The Senate Report directs the courts to make this determination by

"assess[ing] the impact of the challenged structure or practice on the basis of
102.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 72 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

103. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5-6. See generally Davidson, supra note 4 (exploring the
history informing passage of the VRA in 1965 and subsequent amendments to the law). Although
the law is commonly associated with minority registration efforts, Congress recognized that "registration is only the first huddle [sic] to full effective participation in the political process." S. REP.
No. 97-417, at 6. Congress constructed the VRA to provide "a set of mechanisms for dealing with
continuing voting discrimination, not step by step, but comprehensively and finally." Id. at 5.
104.

S. REP. No. 97-417. at 36.

105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 28 (emphasis added).

107.

Id. at 36.

108.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 73 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 63.

109.

See supra text accompanying note 42 for the complete text of section 2(b).

110. See Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the "Conscientious Redistricter", 30
U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 17 (1995); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) (explaining
that "invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts"
even where a law or practice is not facially discriminatory). Justice White, who authored Washington v. Davis, believed the White-Zimmer review could demonstrate the existence of purposeful
discrimination. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 102-03 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
111.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000).
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objective factors,""' 2 specifically the White-Zimmer factors. Through evidence presented under the White-Zimmer test, the court constructs a full
picture of the relationship between race and political participation in the
jurisdiction in question." 3 Most of the factors invoke the relationship between race and voting specifically. The Senate Report instructs courts to
consider the following factors: evidence indicating any history of official
discrimination in voting, whether the locality employs a candidate slating
process that has excluded minority candidates, the extent to which voting is
racially polarized in the community, and the degree of electoral success
achieved by minority candidates.1 4 Other factors address more general considerations, such as lingering socioeconomic effects of past racial
discrimination and the extent to which elected officials are responsive to the
"particularized needs of the members of the minority group."" 5 Evidence
accumulated through this inquiry paints a picture of "the past and present
reality of the local political landscape."' 16 Exploring this reality through the
totality of circumstances analysis incorporates an inquiry into cause-it indicates whether and why a local political process has failed to serve all races
equally without scrutinizing the express purposes behind electoral schemes
or individual ballot selections.
This totality of circumstances approach permits courts to consider
whether race impacts political participation in a manner that discriminates
against racial minorities under the challenged electoral scheme without requiring plaintiffs to prove individual discriminatory intent. It reflects the
legislative compromise that congressional leaders struck to resolve concerns
that the results test effectively granted a right to proportional representation
for minority populations." 7 The totality of circumstances language included
in section 2(b) "maintain[s] the integrity of the results test while at the same
time alleviating fears about proportional representation.""' 8 By demonstrating the existence of several of the White-Zimmer factors, minority plaintiffs
carry their burden of proving that "a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives."' 9
112.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27.

113.

See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 102-03 (White, J., dissenting).

114.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29.

115.

Id. at 29; see also supra note 46 (quoting the nine factors listed in the Senate Report).

116. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 912 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
117. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 193 (additional views of Senator Robert Dole); see also
McKaskle, supra note 110, at 14.
118.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 194 (additional views of Senator Robert Dole).

119. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see also LULAC, 999 F2d at 912 (King,
J., dissenting). The Senate Report makes clear that the nine enumerated factors are not necessarily
the only relevant factors, and plaintiffs are not required to prove any particular number of them, not
even a majority, to make out a claim. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29.
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B. The Supreme Court'sApproach

Supreme Court precedent reflects Congress's decision to identify cause
through a holistic analysis of the evidence. The Supreme Court cases upon
2
which the LULAC- •• majority
primarily relied, 20 Whitcomb v. Chavis1
' and
122
Thornburg v. Gingles, do not endorse a judicial standard that discontinues
the vote dilution inquiry after a brief exchange of statistics. Rather, they reflect Congress's commitment to a determination based on a review of "the
total circumstances of the local electoral process.' ' 3
Whitcomb is evidence that the White-Zimmer test, carefully applied, is
not a cover for proportional representation, even when polarized voting exists. The plaintiffs in Whitcomb failed not simply because partisan affiliation
explained minority electoral losses, but because the totality of the evidence
presented convinced the Court that black voters had equal opportunity to
participate in the political process. 2 The evidence failed to indicate any
structural barriers to minority participation and demonstrated that black
residents in the challenged district as a whole were frequently successful in
electingpropotionl
representatives . of their
choice, even though they did not achieve
25
proportional representation. As the LULAC dissent explained:
Whitcomb stands for the proposition that where there is evidence of partisan voting or interest group politics and no evidence that members of the
minority group have an unequal opportunity to participate in the political
process on account
of race or color, the minority group's vote dilution
26
claim will fail.
Despite legitimate confusion and disagreement about the precise standard the Court was adopting, the Gingles Court clearly respected the
balancing act embraced by pre-Bolden precedent and the 1982 Amendments. Some commentators have suggested that Justice O'Connor's Gingles
concurrence established the standard that the LULAC majority ultimately
adopted, 27 but a close review of her concurring opinion demonstrates that
she advocated a different approach. In Gingles, the defendants argued that
the term "racially polarized voting" must "refer to voting patterns for which

120.

See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 851-59.

121.

403 U.S. 124 (1971).

122.

478 U.S. 30.

123.

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 16.

124.

See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 149-53.

125.

See id. at 150 n.29.

126. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 E2d 831, 907 (5th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting).
127. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1223; E. Jaynie Leung, Page v. Bartels: A
"Total Effects" Approach to Evaluating Racial Vote Dilution Claims, 21 L. & INEQ. 192, 201 n.62
(2003); Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 963 (commenting that the LULAC majority adopted
Justice O'Connor's approach to the causation issue).
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the principal cause is race." ' Justice O'Connor disputed Justice Brennan's
assertion that evidence attributing divergent racial voting patterns to factors
other than race "can never affect the overall vote dilution inquiry."'29 She did
not, however, embrace a standard that precludes a finding of legally significant racially polarized voting
merely because partisan affiliation is shown to
130
affect voter preferences.
In keeping with congressional intent, Justice
O'Connor advocated a comprehensive review of "all relevant factors bearing
on whether the minority group has 'less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.' """ She agreed with Justice Brennan to an extent:
Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted
solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and to assess its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants cannot rebut
this showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns
may be explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying
divergence in the interests of minority and white voters."'
Explanations behind white voters' preferences are relevant to evaluations
of minority electoral success and the responsiveness of elected officials, two
of the factors courts review under the totality of circumstances analysis.'33 In
Justice O'Connor's view, the congressional compromise-permitting a remedy under section 2 without direct evidence of intent but denying a right to
proportional representation-required consideration of the factors influencing voter selections without overly burdening plaintiffs.134 Respecting this
compromise, Justice O'Connor declined "to establish intent as an element of
a plaintiff's case in chief ... [but] was willing to allow such evidence into
35
the record for the courts to consider in determining the ultimate question."'
C. LULAC's Shifted Focus
The LULAC standard abandons Gingles's holistic approach, essentially
isolating causation in the racially polarized voting analysis. While Congress
and the Supreme Court instructed the courts to assess the cumulative impact
of numerous factors, including the "role of racial political considerations in

128.

Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 61 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

129.

Id. at 100 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

130. See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 906 (King, J., dissenting); Grofman & Handley, supra note 11,
at 229; McKaskle, supra note 110, at 33-34; Paula W. Render, Comment, Straight Party Tickets and
Redistricting Thickets: Nonracial Motivations for Voter Preferences, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 505,
512.
131.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1982)).

132.

Id. at 100.

133.

See id. at 100-0 1.

134.

See id. at 84, 100-01; Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 959-60.

135.
228-29.

Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 960; see also Grofman & Handley, supra note 1I, at
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a particular community,"' 3 6 under LULAC courts must inquire into the moti-

vations behind voter preferences as part of1 7a dispositive threshold test,
isolated from the overall vote dilution inquiry.
Rather than infer racial bias through a "searching practical evaluation of
the past and present reality" under the totality of circumstances test,13
LULAC demands a narrower analysis that approaches requiring a showing
of purposeful discrimination on the part of individual voters. 3 9 The LULAC
court's application of the new standard to the vote dilution claims before it
illustrates this point. The plaintiffs in LULAC challenged Texas's system of
electing state trial judges. Specifically, they argued that county-wide, atlarge election of district judges in nine Texas counties violated section 2 by
"impermissibly diluting the voting power of Hispanics and blacks."' 40 They
sought single-member districting, which would allow for majority-minority
judicial districts in which minority voters would have an improved
opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. The district court, and a
panel of the Fifth Circuit on appeal, agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding
that the at-large system resulted in impermissible vote dilution in all nine of
the challenged counties. 14' A majority of the Fifth Circuit CourtS•of142Appeals,
sua sponte, ordered en banc reconsideration of the panel decision. Despite
undisputed evidence that the majority of white voters consistently rejected
the candidate favored by minority voters, 143 the Fifth Circuit en banc
136. S.REP. No. 97-417, at 34 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 212; see also
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 101 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The overall vote dilution inquiry neither
requires nor permits an arbitrary rule against consideration of all evidence concerning voting preferences other than statistical evidence of racial voting patterns.").
137. See infra notes 145-151 and accompanying text (discussing the LULAC majority's
analysis of the plaintiffs' vote dilution claims); infra notes 169-176 and accompanying text (discussing Armstrong v. Allain, 893 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Miss. 1994)); infra notes 219-228 and
accompanying text (discussing Harris v. City of Houston, 10 E Supp. 2d 721 (S.D. Tex. 1997) and
Rollins v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996)); see also O'Donnell, supra note
66, at 374 ("[LULAC] did decide that, at the very least, a plaintiff must negate partisan politics as
the cause of defeat in order to satisfy the third Gingles precondition.").
138.

SEN.

REP. No. 97-417, at 30 (quotation marks omitted).

139. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 909 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting); see also Grofman & Handley, supra note 11, at 222
("LULAC, in shifting the focus to a determination of whether there are non-racial reasons for the
observed racial differences in voting patterns, reintroduced considerations of intent into a section 2
vote dilution challenge."); Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 963 ("[In LULAC,] the Fifth Circuit
adhered to the view that the words 'on account of race or color' meant that, despite the Senate
Report's rejection of the intent test, plaintiffs had to prove some form of purposeful discrimination.").
140.

LULAC, 999 E2d at 838.

141. Id. at 838. On appeal, the panel affirmed with respect to eight of the nine counties. See
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 999 F.2d 831
(5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
142.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 839.

143. E.g., id. at 891 ("Anglo voters always opposed the candidate preferred by the geographically compact and cohesive combined minority population in the general elections."); id. at 892
("There is . . . no dispute that the majority of Anglo voters did not support the candidate favored by
the minority voters in Lubbock County in any of the elections studied.").
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concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish racial bloc voting and
rejected their claims with respect to each of the nine counties.
The LULAC majority credited the defendants' statistical evidence indicating a correlation between race and party affiliation and concluded that
white voters' ballot box selections were politically, not racially, motivated,
and therefore the plaintiffs had not satisfied Gingles's white bloc-voting

precondition.14 Evaluating electoral results for low profile judicial elections
in Dallas, Midland, Lubbock, and Ector counties, for example, the court
considered evidence indicating that white voters consistently defeated the
minority-preferred candidate, that minority voters consistently preferred
Democratic candidates, and that white voters consistently supported
S
146

Republican candidates, including the occasional minority candidate. The
majority cited expert testimony arguing that, in low profile judicial elections, voters "make their choice based upon the information that the ballot
contains-party affiliation."'

47

"[U]nable to find the requisite presence of

race in this data," the majority concluded that the persistent electoral losses
sustained by minority-preferred candidates in these counties were attributable to partisan affiliation, and thus the challenged practice did not violate

section

2.148

The court was too quick to interpret Democratic primary results as dem-

onstrating that partisan affiliation, not race, determined electoral outcomes.
For example, in Lubbock and Ector counties, a minority-preferred candidate
won one of two relevant Democratic primaries, leading the court to reject
the notion that "the minority-preferred candidate was consistently defeated
within the meaning of Gingles," and hold that the plaintiffs could not "establish dilution."'149 In contrast, the court downplayed evidence of polarization

in the Bexar County Democratic primary because "primary elections do not
provide a reliable guide where, as here, both parties are competitive, since

144. Id. at 877 (Dallas County); id. at 886-87 (Tarrant County); id. at 891-92 (Midland
County); id. at 892-93 (Lubbock County); id. at 893 (Ector County). The majority rejected the
plaintiffs' vote dilution claims with respect to all nine challenged counties. In the five counties listed
above, the court made an express finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the racial bloc-voting
preconditions of the Gingles threshold test. In two counties, the court spoke more broadly about the
plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate racially polarized voting but did not make an express Gingles determination. See id. at 889-90 (Bexar County); id. at 890-91 (Jefferson County). In two counties,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs established only a weak vote dilution claim, which the state
overcame in the totality of circumstances analysis. Id. at 885 (Harris County); id. at 887-89 (Travis
County).
145.
test).

See supra text accompanying note 50 (providing the language of the Gingles threshold

146. LULAC, 999 F.2d at 877, 891-93. In three of the nine counties the Fifth Circuit considered, a single instance of majority Anglo support for a Hispanic Republican over an Anglo
Democrat (the 1986 race for Attorney General) satisfied the court that voting patterns were unaffected by the race of the candidates. See id. at 891-93.
147.

Id. at 879.

148.

Id. at 879, 891-93.

149.

Id.at 893.
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they involve only a fraction of the electorate." "0 As the LULAC dissenters

argued, the majority's approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
framework, which "presupposes partisan voting" and finds vote dilution
when the votes of a politically cohesive minority combined with white
5
1
crossover votes are insufficient to prevail over a dominant white majority.
Subsequent decisions in the Fifth Circuit similarly rejected vote dilution
claims for failure to satisfy Gingles's white bloc-voting precondition when

plaintiffs' statistical evidence did not appropriately address the reasons be-

hind racially polarized voting patterns. 5 2 In these cases, a correlation
between race and voting preference did not satisfy the Gingles threshold
test. In short, under LULAC, plaintiffs must be prepared to prove race-based
motivations in the electorate as part of the Gingles threshold requirement.
The LULAC holding does not overlap precisely with the intent requirement expressly rejected by Congress in the 1982 Amendments,'53 but it
embraces a standard that is arguably just as difficult to meet and provokes
some of the same objections that inspired Congress to reject the Bolden
standard in 1982. ' 4 Particularly considering the close relationship between

race and party affiliation,'55 endorsing a scheme in which plaintiffs must
negate partisan politics as an explanation for racially divergent voting patterns allows courts to avoid an analysis of the entire political landscape and
undermines the congressional compromise.5 6 Although the LULAC majority

warned that "courts should not summarily dismiss vote dilution claims in
cases where racially divergent voting patterns correspond with partisan affiliation,"'57 it established and implemented a standard that subordinates the

totality of circumstances review to a selective reliance on a very narrow inquiry. The majority's emphasis on evidence indicating that blacks tended to
vote for Democrats while whites tended to vote for Republicans and that black

150.

Id. at 889.

15I.

Id. at 909-10 (King, J., dissenting).

152.

See infra Part lIl.

153. Compare LULAC, 999 F.2d at 861 ("Because ... divergent voting patterns among white
and minority voters are best explained by partisan affiliation, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed
to establish racial bloc voting .... "), with City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) ("[The
Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote .... ").
154. See LULAC, 999 F.2d at 909 (King, J., dissenting) ("Unless minority plaintiffs can successfully establish that voters in the controlling political party are racially motivated-either through
the use of questionable voting statistics or by calling people from that party and asking them why
they voted the way they did-their claim will fail." (footnote omitted)); see also Scott-McLaughlin,
supra note 9, at 958 (discussing Justice Brennan's argument that requiring plaintiffs to prove white
voters were motivated by racial bias created the same divisiveness as the Bolden official-intent test
rejected in the 1982 Amendments).
155. See Grofman & Handley, supra note 11, at 233; Karlan & Levinson, supra note 76, at
1220-22; infra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
156.

See supra Section I.A.

157.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 860-61.
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candidates enjoyed some electoral successes within Democratic primaries
permitted the majority to overcome "substantial" evidence of vote dilution:
This evidence include[d]: a geographically compact and politically
cohesive minority group; a white bloc vote that is usually sufficient to
defeat the combined strength of minority and white crossover votes; a
history of official discrimination against the minority group; the lingering
socioeconomic effects of discrimination against the minority group;
structural mechanisms, including giant election districts, that tend to
enhance the dilutive nature of at-large election schemes; and an appalling
lack of minority representation on the district court bench.'58
This devotion to partisanship as the explanation for consistent minority
losses in an electoral system that otherwise evoked illegal vote dilution undermines the framework that Congress selected to achieve "full effective
participation in the political process" for all Americans." 9
III. POsT-LULAC: SECTION 2

CLAIMS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Reviewing Fifth Circuit case law since LULAC reveals the degree to
which the LULAC standard burdens plaintiffs when defendants invoke it.
Specifically, in cases in which the defendant introduced evidence suggesting
that nonracial factors impacted voter preferences, plaintiffs lost.'6° Plaintiffs
won when the record contained evidence of intentional discrimination and
when the case proceeded without any real consideration of the causes behind voter preferences.16' Although it is impossible to isolate the presence or
absence of a causation inquiry as the sole reason for the outcome in these
cases, 6 the pattern is unmistakable. In effect, the Fifth Circuit has embraced
an intentional discrimination standard in a narrow class of cases-those in
which the defendants' evidence raises the possibility that some factor other
than race explains voting preferences that appear to diverge along racial
lines.

158.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 901 (King, J., dissenting).

159. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6(1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183; see Karlan
& Levinson, supra note 76, at 1224; see also Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 960 (explaining the
problems associated with a standard that permits "defendants to offer nonracial explanations for
divergent voting patterns"); Tucker, supra note 9, at 591-92 (criticizing the LULAC majority's decision for narrowing the inquiry such that it "only affords section 2 protection to individual ballot
access").
160. See infra notes 170-176, 219-231 and accompanying text. But see infra note 167 (discussing Jamison v. Tupelo, 471 E Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Miss. 2007)). One case may suggest that
evidence of racial animus among the electorate overcomes the defendants' argument that party affiliation could explain voting preferences, but the court did not expressly develop this reasoning. See
infra note 210 (discussing St. Bernard Citizens for Better Gov't v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., No.
CIV.A 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002)).
161.

See infra notes 209-214 and accompanying text (evaluating plaintiff wins).

162. See infra notes 165, 234-236 and accompanying text (discussing other potential explanations for certain losses).

February 2009]

The Impact of LULAC v. Clements on Section 2

The significance of this heightened burden is tempered by the small

number of cases in which it comes into play: The number of post-LULAC
decisions that turn on the causation issue is quite small. Between 1982 and
1993, Fifth Circuit courts found a violation of section 2 in seventeen out of
thirty published opinions that considered racially polarized voting, roughly
fifty-seven percent."63 Between 1993 and 2007, after the Fifth Circuit's opinion in LULAC, these courts found a violation in eight out of twenty-two
similar lawsuits considering racially polarized voting, roughly thirty-six
percent.' 64 While these figures represent a marked decline in plaintiff success

rates, LULAC causation was not an explicit factor in most of these decisions.
Only three of the fourteen opinions that found no section 2 violation mentioned evidence that addressed the causes behind divergent voting
patterns.165 As the Fifth Circuit refined the LULAC standard during the mid-

1990s, it became clear that in order to invoke that standard, defendants had
to come forward with probative evidence indicating that some factor other
than race explained racially divergent voting.' 66 The challenge of meeting

163. See Appendix. For the period between the Gingles decision and LULAC (1986-1993),
the percentage remains about the same: courts in the Fifth Circuit found violations in roughly fiftyeight percent of published opinions that considered racially polarized voting. The numbers discussed
in this Part include cases in which the court considered the existence of racially polarized voting
either under the Gingles threshold test or as part of the totality of circumstances analysis. The numbers include cases in which the court made a final determination on liability; they exclude
preliminary decisions such as orders granting or denying preliminary injunctions. A searchable
database, prepared by the Voting Rights Initiative at the University of Michigan Law School, categorized published opinions in section 2 lawsuits between 1982 and 2006. Ellen Katz & The Voting
Rights Initiative, VRI Database Master List (2006), http://www.votingreport.org (follow "Master
List xls" hyperlink under "Final Report" menu). The Appendix is an excerpt from that database,
with the addition of more recent cases to bring the complete list up to date through 2007.
164. See Appendix. The eight cases are: Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996);
Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440
(S.D. Miss. 2007); Jamison v. Tupelo, 471 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Miss. 2007); St. Bernard Citizens,
WL 2022589; Houston v. Lafayette County, 20 F. Supp. 2d. 996 (N.D. Miss. 1998); Gunn v. Chickasaw County, No. CIV.A. l:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997); League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Tex. 1995). The
United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's conclusion that there was no section 2 violation in one case. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam), rev'd sub
nom. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). The reversal turned on the
Court's evaluation of the first Gingles precondition, not on the racially polarized voting analysis.
Adding this final decision to the calculation brings the total number of section 2 violations to nine
out of twenty-two, roughly forty percent.
165. Rollins v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996); Harris v. City of
Houston, 10 F. Supp. 2d 721 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Armstrong v. Allain, 893 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Miss.
1994). A thorough analysis of why the remaining thirteen lawsuits failed is beyond the scope of this
Note. Several courts concluded the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of white bloc voting
without any discussion of the quality of the evidence. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens
v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 123 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 1997); Rangel v. Morales, 8 F.3d 242 (5th Cir.
1993). Others lost on the first prong of Gingles (requiring a minority population sufficiently large
and geographically compact that a viable single-member district could be drawn). See, e.g., Sensley
v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004); Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 165 E3d 368 (5th
Cir. 1999). Others failed under the totality of circumstances analysis. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fordice,
252 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001).
166.

See infra Section IIl.A.
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this initial burden may partially explain why the causation issue is absent
from many of decisions.
This Part evaluates Fifth Circuit case law post-LULAC, highlighting
some notable trends. Section III.A explains that the Fifth Circuit has
effectively narrowed the LULAC causation standard so that it does not
impose the impossible burden on plaintiffs that some commentators had
feared. Section III.B argues that, nevertheless, the LULAC standard, when
invoked, inserts a substantial obstacle into the racial bloc-voting analysis. In
the face of a statistical correlation between race and vote, when defendants
produced evidence that race-neutral
factors influenced voting patterns,
6
plaintiffs lost their section 2 claim.1 1
A. Refining the LULAC Standard

As commentators feared, 68 shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided
LULAC, two district courts, in three lawsuits, embraced an expansive interpretation of the LULAC standard. 69 The first, Armstrong v. Allain, illustrates
the heavy burden the original LULAC causation standard imposed on plaintiffs: the district court's strict application of the standard was fatal to the
plaintiffs' vote dilution claim. The district court noted that, under LULAC,
plaintiffs must do more than show a correlation between race and vote in
order to satisfy the third Gingles precondition. White bloc voting is not legally significant "unless race is shown to be the reason for that bloc
voting." 170 The Armstrong plaintiffs challenged a state law requiring school
bond referenda to pass by a sixty percent vote, arguing that the supermajority requirement diluted black voting strength. Black residents tended to
vote cohesively, and when they voted in favor of school bond 72referenda,
white bloc voting in opposition frequently frustrated their efforts.
Because it applied a standard that demanded that the plaintiffs' evidence
demonstrate a direct causal link between race and vote, the court was able to
overcome statistical evidence exhibiting a correlation between race and
vote. The court sought "the reason for the difference in [voting] choices"
between blacks and whites.7 7 The plaintiffs tried to provide one: Presenting

167. Jamison v. Tupelo is a perplexing exception to this pattern. Jamison, 471 F Supp. 2d at
713-14; see also infra notes 216-219 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 75 (characterizing the holding in LULAC as requiring
plaintiffs "to defeat every possibility other than race for denial of their right to vote").
169. See Teague v. Attala County, No. CIV.A.l:91CV209-D-D, 1995 WL 1945393, at *7-8
(N.D. Miss. Mar. 20, 1995), rev'd, 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996); Armstrong, 893 F Supp. at 1331-32;
Houston v. Lafayette County, 841 E Supp. 751 (N.D. Miss. 1993), vacated 56 F.3d 606 (5th Cir.
1995).
170.

Armstrong, 893 F. Supp. at 1330.

171.

Id. at 1321.

172.

Id. at 1322.

173.

Id. at 1331.
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statistical evidence identifying racially polarized voting patterns, 74 they argued that white voters tended to oppose school bond referenda because they
"perceive[d] public schools as black institutions which they [chose] not to
support."'7' The court rejected this argument because it found that, statewide, black students comprised only a bare majority of public school
students, and in many of the school districts where school bond issues
failed, black students accounted
for significantly less than fifty percent of
76
the student population.
This case illustrates the challenge plaintiffs face when they are required
to disprove all causal factors other than race or to present conclusive evidence of discriminatory intent among voters. 77 Despite an absence of
evidence demonstrating that other, race-neutral factors explained the pattern
of polarized voting, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim because it concluded • that
race was not the "predominant determinant" of voting
178
behavior. The court noted that whites owned the majority of owneroccupied property in the state and-although the defendants failed to present evidence to this effect-speculated that, while the "[p]laintiffs view the
issue in terms of black and white, . . . it is just as plausible, if not more so, to
view the issue as a tax/no-tax issue."'7 9 The district court's approach in this
case implemented the LULAC causation standard expansively. It placed the
burden on the plaintiffs to disprove other plausible explanations for racially
polarized voting patterns, even though the defendants did not offer evidence
to raise the issue. This decision lent credence to commentators' fears that,
with LULAC, the Fifth Circuit had eviscerated the VRA.' 8°
The Fifth Circuit did not consider Armstrong v. Allain on appeal, but
soon after that decision came down, it rejected a similar analysis in two
separate cases, both on appeal from the Northern District of Mississippi:
Houston v. Lafayette County' s ' and Teague v. Attala County. In these two
cases, the Fifth Circuit moderated the potential impact of its original opinion
in LULAC
by effectively narrowing the scope of the LULAC court's hold83
ing.

174.

Id. at 1328-29.

175.

Id. at 1331.

176.

Id.

177.

See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.

178. Armstrong, 893 F. Supp. at 1331. For the origin of the term "predominant determinant,"
see League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 855 (5th Cir. 1993)
(en banc) (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417, at 33 (1982), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 211).
179.

Armstrong, 893 F. Supp. at 1331.

180.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.

181.

56 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1995).

182.

92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996).

183. See Teague, 92 F.3d at 295 (reversing the lower court opinion and entering judgment for
the plaintiffs); Houston, 56 F.3d at 613 (vacating the lower court's judgment with respect to the
Gingles preconditions and remanding for additional findings).
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First, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed that statistical evidence indicating a
correlation between race and voting preference was probative of racial bloc
voting, even when that evidence failed to indicate why people voted along
racial lines. In Houston, the Fifth Circuit criticized the lower court for summarily rejecting the plaintiffs' statistical evidence of polarized voting merely
because the evidence "look[ed] strictly at how, rather than why, people vote
the way they do. ' 4 Quoting LULAC, the court reiterated that evidence attributing polarized voting patterns "'to partisan affiliation or perceived
interests rather than race [is] quite probative on the question of a minority
group's future success at the polls.'

,,85

It then clarified the scope of that

statement, stating that "evidence that lacks such evaluation of the voters'
possible motivations still carries probative value."'' 8 6 Provided the evidence
has "facial plausibility,"'' 1 7 the court should consider it, and at the very least,
"the district court must ensure that it thoroughly discusses its reasons for
rejecting that evidence."'"" The court of appeals remanded the case for further clarification on the issue of racially polarized voting."' On remand,
with no discussion of causation, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence satisfied the second and third Gingles preconditions.'" 0 The
court, after considering the White-Zimmer factors briefly, found a section 2
violation. '9'

A year later, the Fifth Circuit further refined the LULAC holding by addressing the placement and scope of the burdens of production and
persuasion in the causation inquiry. In Teague, the district court concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to prove racially polarized voting because the evi-92
dence in the record failed to address the reasons behind voter preferences.
The district court opined that "factors other than race influence voters in
Attala County"'93 and noted that "[c]onspicuously missing from the record
in this cause is any proof to the contrary."'91 4 In fact, there was "no proof in
the record that in any way compare[d] the candidates on any basis other than
race." 95 Thus, giving the plaintiffs the burden of either affirmatively proving
that racial considerations caused white voters' votes or disproving all other
184.

Houston, 56 F.3d at 612 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court).

185. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements,
999 F.2d 831, 859 n.26 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc)).
186.

Id.

187.

Id.

188.

Id. n.6 (quoting Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994)).

189.

Id. at 613.

190.

Houston v. Lafayette County, 20 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002 (N.D. Miss. 1998).

191.

See id. at 1003.

192.

See Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1996).

193. Teague v. Attala County, No. CIVA. 1:91CV209-D--D, 1995 WL 1945393, at *7 (N.D.
Miss. Mar. 20, 1995), rev'd, 92 F3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996).
194.

Id.

195.

Id.
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potential explanations for voting patterns that clearly diverged along racial
lines, the district
court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove racial
96
polarization.1
The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected this approach to the racially polarized
voting analysis and held that defendants bore the burden of demonstrating
that a perceived correlation between race and vote was attributable to some
nonracial factor. The court explained that the district court "err[ed] by placing the burden on plaintiffs to disprove that factors other than race affect
voting patterns."' 97 Rather, the statistical evidence, which "favor[ed] a finding of racial bloc voting in Attala County, ' " should have raised a
presumption in the plaintiff's favor, which the defendant could then rebut by
showing that race-neutral factors explained voting pattems., 99 An absence of
contradictory evidence favors the plaintiff, and when faced with a strong
statistical case, anecdotal lay testimony asserting that "race played no role at
the polls carr[ies] little weight. ''2°° The Fifth Circuit's decision in Teague
clarified that when the defendant produces "no real evidence that factors
other than race [are] at work," plaintiffs are not required to disprove all nonracial explanations for election results.2 0 ' Together, Houston and Teague
established that, in the absence of defense evidence revealing that some factor other than race caused polarized voting, a vote dilution claimant may
prevail with evidence revealing only a correlation between race and vote.
Nevertheless, these cases left some critical questions unresolved. Perhaps because the defendants in Teague failed to introduce any substantial
evidence contradicting the plaintiffs' racial bloc-voting claim, 202 the Fifth
Circuit did not evaluate precisely what kind of defense evidence would shift
the burden to the plaintiffs.0 3 In addition, neither of these two decisions resolved the questions that arise when defendants do introduce such evidence.
Most importantly, how do plaintiffs successfully respond to evidence suggesting that race-neutral factors influenced divergent voting patters?2°4 The
court's choice of language suggests that it envisioned a comprehensive review of the local facts: "Plaintiffs are to present evidence of racial bias
operating in the electoral system by proving up the Gingles factors.
Defendants may then rebut the plaintiffs' evidence by showing that no such
196.

See id.

197.

Teague, 92 F.3d at 290.

198.

Id. at 291 (quoting the district court).

199.

Id. at 290-91.

200.

Id. at 291.

201.

Id.

202.

See id.

203. Proceeding to the totality of circumstances analysis, the court suggested that defendants
"try to rebut plaintiffs' claim of vote dilution via evidence of 'objective, nonracial factors under the
totality of the circumstances standard."' Id. at 292 (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1513
(1 th Cir. 1994)).
204. The Fifth Circuit also did not address when, if ever, a court would demand explicit evidence of racial animus.
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bias exists in the relevant voting community."20 5 Although this description of
206
the respective burdens reflects Justice O'Connor's language in Gingles, and
more closely adheres to Congress's instructions than the standard applied by
the district court in Teague, subsequent cases do not confirm that the circuit
has shifted from the court's initial position in LULAC, which established causation as a discrete inquiry for plaintiffs to overcome in the racial bloc2 07
voting analysis.
In Houston and Teague, the Fifth Circuit backtracked from the sweeping

implications of LULAC. It clarified that, at the very least, defendants must
make a plausible showing that some force other than race is in play before
plaintiffs must prove that race is in fact the cause driving racially polarized
voting. The fact that the initial burden lies with the defendant may explain
why only a few cases turn on the LULAC causation issue. Yet cases decided
after Houston and Teague show that even this refined causation standard

imposes a nearly insurmountable burden on plaintiffs. 208
B. Causation in the Courts
Even as moderated by Houston and Teague, the LULAC standard may
prove outcome determinative. In the years following LULAC, plaintiffs lost

nearly every case in which the defendants offered evidence that factors other
than race caused racially polarized voting. Between 1993 and 2007, courts

in the Fifth Circuit found a violation of section 2 in eight of twenty-two
published opinions that considered racially polarized voting. 2°9 Two of the
eight decisions involved evidence of racial animus either among the elector-

ate 210 or among local officials. 211 In three of the eight opinions, the court
expressly noted the defendants' failure to introduce any probative evidence

indicating that nonracial considerations explained voter preferences, 112 and

205.

Teague, 92 F.3d at 290.

206.

See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.

207.

See infra Section II.B.

208.

See infra Section IH.B.

209.

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

210. See St. Bernard Citizens for Better Gov't v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIV.A. 022209, 2002 WL 2022589 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002). In that case, the district court noted widespread
electoral support, among both Republicans and Democrats, for a candidate who was a known white
supremacist and member of the Ku Klux Klan. It added that "[it is also worth noting that [St.
Bernard Parish] is ...nearly 65 percent registered Democrat and just 19.5 percent registered Republican.' Id. at *7.This is the extent of the court's discussion of party affiliation. It may indicate that
the court considered the role of party in explaining voter choices and found it unpersuasive in this
case. The district court did not explain the significance it attached to the community's support for a
white supremacist, but it seems reasonable to consider it evidence of racial animus in the electorate.
211. United States v. Brown, 494 E Supp. 2d 440, 485 (S.D. Miss. 2007) (finding that local
Democratic Party officials intentionally discriminated against white voters).
212. See Teague v. Attala County, 92 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1996); Clark v. Calhoun County, 88
F.3d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 903 F
Supp. 1071 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
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two more decisions made no reference to causation. These five cases may
reflect the impact of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Teague, which clarified
that the LULAC causation inquiry will proceed only if the defendant has met
its initial burden of production on causation.2 4 Together, these seven cases
suggest that in order for plaintiffs to win a section 2 claim, they may have to
present evidence of racial animus in the community, or the case must proceed without evidence suggesting a race-neutral explanation for racially
divergent voting patterns.
One decision in which the court found a violation of section 2, Jamison
v. Tupelo, does not fit the pattern.1 5 It seemed to ignore LULAC altogether,
inexplicably concluding that the defendants' evidence attributing racially
polarized voting to partisanship, not racial bias, was irrelevant because
"lt]he reasons that black and white voters vote differently have no relevance
to the central inquiry of § 2, but the correlation between the race of the voter
and the selection of certain candidates is crucial to that inquiry. 2 6 In
Jamison, the plaintiffs met their Gingles burden by "show[ing] a correlation
between race [of the voter] and candidate choice.,, 21 The court went on to
consider the White-Zimmer factors under the totality of circumstances
analysis, included no further discussion of causation, and found a violation
of section 2.28
Apart from the anomaly of Jamison, plaintiffs lost every case in which
the defendants presented credible evidence that factors other than a candidate's race could explain voter preferences. When the evidence
demonstrates a general correlation between race and party among the electorate, the search for the LULAC brand of causation-essentially, evidence
that party affiliation is not the cause of racially divergent voting preferencesis an enormous evidentiary hurdle. For example, in Harrisv. City of Houston,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' vote dilution claim because the defendants
presented persuasive evidence indicating that residents in the contested area
voted according to political affiliation, not race.2 1 This result minimizes the
role that race plays in determining party affiliations and fails to account for the

213.

See Houston v. Lafayette County, 20 F. Supp. 2d. 996 (N.D. Miss. 1998); Gunn v.

Chickasaw County, No. CIV.A. 1:92CV142-JAD, 1997 WL 33426761 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 28, 1997).
214.

See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (discussing Teague).

215.

471 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D. Miss. 2007).

216.

Jamison, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 713-14.

217.

ld. at 714.

218. Id. at 715-16. The defendant, the city of Tupelo, Mississippi, did not appeal the court's
decision in this case. Instead, it agreed to adopt and submit to the Department of Justice for approval
a redistricting plan that complied with the court's decision. See Agreed Order, Jamison v. Tupelo,
No. l:04cv366-M-B (N.D. Miss. March 5, 2007). On February 12, 2008, Chief Judge Mills dismissed the case without prejudice after Tupelo submitted a redistricting plan to the Department of
Justice. Order, Jamison v. Tupelo, Civil Action No. 1:04cv366 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 12, 2008).
219. 10 F. Supp. 2d 721, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1997). The city's expert argued that race did not drive
voter preferences; rather, "Democrats [were] 'the minority that the Kingwood voters [would not]
support."' Harris, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
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difficulty of separating out racial from partisan concerns."" Because "race
and political affiliation are ...substantially correlated[] [i]t is ...impossible to determine which of the two is a better explanation ...of voting
patterns. 22' In light of this correlation, evidence that the political party preferred by minority voters consistently lost elections is "indeterminate with
respect to the causal role of race in affecting voting behavior.' 222 Yet under
the Fifth Circuit's causation standard, this evidence seems to be dispositive.
It will consistently defeat plaintiffs' efforts to demonstrate racial bloc voting, without which their claim is almost certain to fail, thereby perpetuating
"precisely the sort of racial exclusion that section 2 and Gingles sought to
remedy.' 223 Permitting partisanship to "explain away" racially polarized voting is a step backward, not a step toward greater equality in political
participation.
The second case, Rollins v. Fort Bend Independent School District,24 illustrates the extent of the LULAC burden. It suggests that a plaintiff's failure
to identify a causal relationship between race and voting patterns under the
racial bloc-voting inquiry may tip the evidentiary scales in favor of defendants when each side has presented a viable theory to explain a history of
minority electoral losses. In Rollins, the court of appeals noted that the district court found that the parties presented very similar statistical evidence,
which their respective experts interpreted quite differently.225 In part because
the plaintiffs' statistics failed to "isolate the impact of race on election results as compared to other potential factors entering into a citizen's voting
decision," the district court discounted the plaintiffs' interpretation of the
226
evidence. The defendants' statistical evidence did not expressly address
causation either; rather, it indicated that "the white vote is much more randomly distributed [than the black vote] with respect to race." 227 The court
concluded that these deviations "recognize[d] the frequent presence of reasons other than a candidate's race to explain the defeat of that candidate. 228
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that it was "curious that only three
minorities in the last twenty years [had] successfully been elected to the

220. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements (LULAC), 999 F.2d 831, 908 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (King, J., dissenting); Grofman & Handley, supra note 11, at 233; Karlan &
Levinson, supra note 76, at 1220-24.
221.

Karlan & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1223 (emphasis omitted).

222. Id. at 1224; Grofman & Handley, supra note 11, at 231-32 ("Racial differences in partisanship [may be] explained in part by the race-relevant differences in the policy positions taken by
the political parties.").
223.

Karlan & Levinson, supra note 76, at 1224.

224.

89 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1996).

225.

Id. at 1216.

226. Id. at 1217 n.23. Failure to consider causation was not the only flaw in the plaintiffs'
evidence. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
227.

Rollins, 89 F.3d. at 1216.

228.

Id.
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board of trustees for the [Fort Bend Independent School District]." 29 In light
of the plaintiffs' "facially persuasive statistics," the court concluded that it

could not "say unequivocally that the [Fort Bend Independent School
District] system does not in fact violate the Voting Rights Act. 230 Nonetheless, under the clearly erroneous standard of review, it affirmed the district
court's determination that the plaintiffs had "failed to establish a violation

with the evidence they presented in this case. 23'
At first glance, this reasoning is similar to that employed by the district
court-and rejected by the Fifth Circuit-in the Houston and Teague cases. 232 The plaintiffs presented statistical evidence of racially polarized
voting, and the defendants failed to advance a persuasive race-neutral expla233
nation for the pattern,
yet the district court, noting the absence of a
causation element in the plaintiffs' evidence, found no violation of section 2.
The accuracy of this analogy is obscured by the Fifth Circuit's emphasis on
the weaknesses in the plaintiffs' presentation of their evidence. 234 Rollins

may be most accurately categorized as a case in which the district court so
thoroughly discounted the plaintiffs' testimony because of error and inconsistency that no presumption of polarization could arise. On the other hand,

one of the "flaws" the Fifth Circuit identified was the plaintiffs' failure to
present a multivariate regression analysis that considered the influence of
nonracial factors on voter behavior.2 3 This criticism suggests that the district
court placed significant weight on the plaintiffs' failure to present evidence

of race-based causation.
Although these two cases illustrate how the LULAC causation inquiry
has been applied to the detriment of section 2 plaintiffs, failure to demon-

strate a causal relationship between race and vote was not the only factor at
work in these decisions. In both Harris v. City of Houston and Rollins, the

district court discounted the plaintiffs' evidence because of its poor quality

229.

Id. at 1214.

230.

Id. at 1219.

231.

Id.

232. See supra Section IA. Note that the Fifth Circuit issued its decision in Teague about a
month after its resolution of the Rollins appeal.
233. The Fifth Circuit opinion indicates that the school district argued in district court that
minority electoral losses were caused by an absence of" 'serious' candidates," judged by the amount
of money raised and spent by the campaign, but the Fifth Circuit rejected the suggestion that a
causal connection existed between funding and defeat at the polls. Rollins, 89 F.3d at 1215 & n.20.
234. See id. at 1214, 1217-19. The Fifth Circuit, hesitant to deny that vote dilution occurred
in the school district, was persuaded by the record, which was "replete with examples of contradicted testimony, inadequate evidence, errors, and concessions that permitted the district court to
discount the plaintiffs' evidence and, consequently, their legal theories." Id. at 1214.
235. See id. at 1217 n.23. The court found that "although the plaintiffs were not required
under existing case law to present a multi-variate regression analysis comparing the impact of other
factors affecting voting, had they done so this evidence may have helped them to prove the existence
of a significant bloc vote in the present case." Id. at 1219.
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generally, not just because it omitted evidence of cause. Furthermore, although each decision noted that the plaintiffs' failure to establish the
Gingles preconditions relieved the court of its obligation to further pursue
the vote dilution analysis, both conducted a cursory review of the
White-Zimmer factors, concluding that even under the totality of circumstances analysis, the plaintiffs failed to establish vote dilution. 237 But where
the courts weigh counterevidence impeaching the plaintiffs' statistical

analysis on causation grounds and decide that the plaintiffs' evidence is insufficient to support a finding of legally significant white bloc voting, the
rest of their analysis may be biased in favor of the defendant.238
Moreover, the fact remains that when challenged to prove causation in
the face of a correlation between race and party, plaintiffs have failed to
convince the court that a demonstrated correlation between race and vote is
the more persuasive explanation for racially divergent voting patterns. It
remains to be seen what kind of evidence-perhaps apart from evidence of
intentional discrimination at work in the community 9-woul
establish
legally significant racial bloc voting when the defense has presented a correlation between race and party.
CONCLUSION

The standard enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in LULAC, which effectively requires an inquiry into individual voters' intent in the voting booth,
misinterpreted both congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent. The
published opinions of Fifth Circuit courts since LULAC demonstrate that the
LULAC causation inquiry is not the only reason why plaintiffs lose in the
circuit-but it may be true that in order to win in the Fifth Circuit, a case
must proceed without any inquiry into causation. Although only a small
number of cases raised the issue of LULAC causation, decisions that found a
violation of section 2 are notably devoid of evidence debating the causes
behind polarized voting patterns. Whenever a defendant introduced evidence

236. Id. at 1214; Harris v. City of Houston, 10 F. Supp. 2d 721, 725-26 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(explaining that the testimony of plaintiffs' expert witness "lacked probative value" because his
opinions were "based on flawed assumptions and questionable methodology").
237. Rollins, 89 F3d at 1214 (noting that the Fifth Circuit did not need to review the district
court's discussion of the White-Zimmer factors because it concluded the court had correctly applied
the Gingles threshold test and ruled against the plaintiffs); Harris, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 728
("[P]laintiffs have failed to prove that, under the totality of the circumstances, minorities do not
possess the same opportunities to participate in the City political process and to elect representatives
of their choice... ).
238. See Rollins, 89 F.3d at 1214 n.13. Although the plaintiffs argued that the district court's
misapplication of the white bloc-voting legal standard affected its discussion of the White-Zimmner
factors, the Fifth Circuit decided not to address this argument because it determined that the lower
court applied the correct legal standard. Id.
239. See supra note 210 (discussing St. Bernard Citizens for Better Gov't v. St. Bernard
Parish Sch. Bd., No. CIVA. 02-2209, 2002 WL 2022589 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2002)).
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of nonracial factors not necessarily limited to party affiliation, 2A° plaintiffs
generally lost. It is impossible to draw a definitive conclusion, but this pattern suggests that the standard, when it is invoked, severely burdens section
2 plaintiffs who must struggle to demonstrate racial bias in the electorate.

240. See Rollins, 89 F.3d at 1216; Armstrong v. Allain, 893 F. Supp. 1320, 1331-32 (S.D.
Miss. 1994).
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FIFTH CIRCUIT SECTION 2 CASES CONSIDERING RACIALLY
1
POLARIZED VOTING, 1986-200724

Case Name
Rocha v. Fagan
Major v. Treen
Political Civil Voters Org. v.

Court

Date

Section 2
Violation?

No. V-79-26, 1982 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15164
574 F. Supp. 325
565 F. Supp. 338

S.D. Tex.

1982

No

E.D. La.
N.D. Tex.

1983
1983

Yes
No

599 F. Supp. 397
604 F. Supp. 807
725 F.2d 1017
591 F. Supp. 802

N.D. Miss.
N.D. Miss.
5th Cir.
W.D. Tex.

1984
1984
1984
1984

Yes
Yes
No
Yes

727 F.2d 364
749 F.2d 1134
581 F. Supp. 1329
772 F.2d 143
648 F. Supp. 596

5th Cir.
5th Cir.
N.D. Tex.
5th Cir.
W.D. Tex.

1984
1984
1984
1985
1986

Yes
No
No
No
Yes

834 F.2d 496

5th Cir.

1987

Yes

819 F.2d 609

5th Cir.

1987

No

S.D. Miss.
5th Cir.
N.D. Miss.
5th Cir.
5th Cir.
5th Cir.
5th Cir.
M.D. La.
N.D. Miss.
N.D. Tex.
5th Cir.

1987
1988
1989
1989
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1990
1991

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

946 F.2d 1109

5th Cir.

1991

Yes

932 F.2d 400

5th Cir.

1991

Yes

964 F.2d 1542

5th Cir.

1992

No

S.D. Miss.

1993

Yes

Citation

Terrell

Jordan v.City of Greenwood
Jordan v. Winter
Velasquez v. Abilene
Sierra v. El Paso Ind. Sch.
Dist.
Jones v. Lubbock
McCarty v. Henson
Terrazas v. Clements
Seastrunk v. Bums
League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Midland Indep.
Sch. Dist.
Citizens for a Better Gretna v.
Gretna
Washington v. Tensas Parish
Sch. Bd.
Martin v.Allain
Campos v. Baytown
Gunn v.Chickasaw County
Monroe v. City of Woodville
Houston v. Haley
Brewer v. Ham
Overton v. City of Austin
Clark v. Roemer
Ewing v. Monroe County
Williams v. City of Dallas
E. Jefferson Coal. for
Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of
Jefferson
Westwego Citizens for Better
Gov't v. City of Westwego
Miss. State Chapter,
Operation Push, Inc. v. Mabus
Salas v. Sw. Tex. Jr. Coll.
Dist.
Bryant v. Lawrence County

241.

658 F. Supp. 1183
840 F.2d 1240
705 F. Supp. 315
881 F.2d 1327
869 F.2d 807
876 F.2d 448
871 F.2d 529
777 F. Supp. 445
740 F. Supp. 417
734 F. Supp. 1317
926 F.2d 487

814 F. Supp. 1346

See supra notes 163-164 for further information on the cases included in this Appendix.
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Court
5th Cir.
5th Cir.

Date
1993
1993

Section 2
Violation?
No
No

5th Cir.
S.D. Miss.
W.D. Tex.

1993
1994
1995

No
No
Yes

5th Cir.
5th Cir.
5th Cir.

1996
1996
1996

Yes
Yes
No

1997 WL 33426761

N.D. Miss.

Yes

Campos v.City of Houston
Harris v.City of Houston
League of United Latin Am.
Citizens No. 4552 v.Roscoe
Indep. Sch. Dist.
Houston v.Lafayette County
Perez v.Pasadena Indep.
Sch. Dist.
Dillworth v.Clark
NAACP v. Fordice
Balderas v.Texas

113 F.3d 544
10 F.Supp. 2d 721
123 F.3d 843

5th Cir.
S.D. Tex.
5th Cir.

Oct. 27,
1997
1997
1997
1997

20 F.Supp. 2d 996
165 F.3d 368

N.D. Miss.
5th Cir.

1998
1999

Yes
No

129 F.Supp. 2d 966
252 F.3d 361
2001 WL 34104833

S.D. Miss.
5th Cir.
E.D. Tex.

No
No
No

St. Bernard Citizens for Better
Gov't v.St. Bernard Parish
Sch. Bd.
Sensley v.Albritton
Boddie v.City of Cleveland
Rodriguez v.Bexar County
League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v.Perry
Jamison v.Tupelo
United States v.Brown

2002 WL 2022589

E.D. La.

2000
2001
Nov. 28,
2001
Aug. 26,
2002

385 F.3d 591
297 F.Supp. 2d 901
385 F.3d 853
No. 05-204, slip op.

5th Cir.
N.D. Miss.
5th Cir.
U.S.

471 F.Supp. 2d 706
494 F.Supp. 2d 440

N.D. Miss.
S.D. Miss.

Case Name
Magnolia Bar Ass'n v.Lee
League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v.Clements
Rangel v.Morales
Armstrong v.Allain
League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v.N.E. Indep. Sch.
Dist.
Teague v.Attala County
Clark v.Calhoun County
Rollins v. Fort Bend Indep.
Sch. Dist.
Gunn v.Chickasaw County

Citation
994 F.2d 1143
999 F.2d 831
8F.3d 242
893 F.Supp. 1320
903 F.Supp. 1071
92 F.3d 283
88 F.3d 1393
89 F.3d 1205

2004
2004
2004
Jun. 28,
2006
2007
2007

No
No
No

Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

710
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